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2Who we are
Elisa Heymann
Richard Lous
Bart Miller
Jim Kupsch
Vamshi Basupalli
Josef  (Bolo) Burger
Sriharsha Yerramalla
http://www.cs.wisc.edu/mist/
3What do we do
• Assess Middleware: Make cloud/grid 
software more secure
• Train: We teach tutorials for users, 
developers, sys admins, and managers
• Research: Make in-depth assessments 
more automated and improve quality of 
automated code analysis
http://www.cs.wisc.edu/mist/papers/VAshort.pdf
Our History
2001: “Playing Inside the Black Box” paper, first demonstration 
of hijacking processes in the Cloud.
2004: First formal funding from US NSF.
2004: First assessment activity, based on Condor, and started 
development of our methodology (FPVA).
2006: Start of joint effort between UW and UAB.
2006: Taught first tutorial at San Diego Supercomputer Center.
2007: First NATO funding, jointly to UAB, UW, and Ben Gurion
University.
2008: First authoritative study of automated code analysis tools.
2009: Published detailed report on our FPVA methodology.
2009: U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security funding support.
2012: DHS Software Assurance Marketplace (SWAMP) research    
center.
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5Our experience
Condor, University of Wisconsin
Batch queuing workload management system
15 vulnerabilities 600 KLOC of C and C++
SRB, SDSC
Storage Resource Broker - data grid
5 vulnerabilities 280 KLOC of C
MyProxy, NCSA
Credential Management System
5 vulnerabilities 25 KLOC of C
glExec, Nikhef
Identity mapping service
5 vulnerabilities 48 KLOC of C
Gratia Condor Probe, FNAL and Open Science Grid
Feeds Condor Usage into Gratia Accounting System
3 vulnerabilities 1.7 KLOC of Perl and Bash
Condor Quill, University of Wisconsin
DBMS Storage of Condor Operational and Historical Data
6 vulnerabilities 7.9 KLOC of C and C++
6Wireshark, wireshark.org
Network Protocol Analyzer 
2 vulnerabilities 2400 KLOC of C
Condor Privilege Separation, Univ. of Wisconsin
Restricted Identity Switching Module
2 vulnerabilities 21 KLOC of C and C++
VOMS Admin, INFN
Web management interface to VOMS data   
4 vulnerabilities 35 KLOC of Java and PHP
CrossBroker, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Resource Mgr for Parallel & Interactive Applications
4 vulnerabilities 97 KLOC of C++
ARGUS 1.2, HIP, INFN, NIKHEF, SWITCH 
gLite Authorization Service
0 vulnerabilities 42 KLOC of Java and C 
Our experience
7Our experience
VOMS Core  INFN
Virtual Organization Management System
1 vulnerability  161 KLOC of  Bourne Shell, C++ and C
iRODS, DICE
Data-management System
9 vulnerabilities (and counting) 285 KLOC of C and C++
Google Chrome, Google
Web browser
1 vulnerability 2396 KLOC of C and C++
WMS, INFN
Workload Management System
in progress                728 KLOC of Bourne Shell,  C++, 
C, Python, Java, and Perl
CREAM, INFN
Computing Resource Execution And Management
5 vulnerabilities   216 KLOC of Bourne Shell, Java, and C++
8Overview
• Some basics and terminology
• Thinking like an attacker
– “Owning the bits”
• Thinking like an analyst
– A brief overview of in-depth vulnerability 
assessment
• Thinking like a programmer/designer
– Secure programming techniques
9What is Software Security?
› Software security means protecting 
software against malicious attacks 
and other risks.
› Security is necessary to provide 
availability, confidentiality, and 
integrity. 
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What is a Vulnerability?
“A vulnerability is a defect or weakness in 
system security procedures, design, 
implementation, or internal controls that can 
be exercised and result in a security breach 
or violation of security policy.”
- Gary McGraw, Software Security
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What is a Vulnerability?
A weakness allowing a principal (e.g. a user) to 
gain access to or influence a system beyond the 
intended rights.
– Unauthorized user can gain access.
– Authorized user can: 
• gain unintended privileges – e.g. root or admin.
• damage a system.
• gain unintended access to data or information.
• delete or change another user’s data.
• impersonate another user.
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What is a Weakness
(or Defect or Bug)?
“Software bugs are errors, mistakes, or 
oversights in programs that result in 
unexpected and typically undesirable behavior.”
The Art of Software Security Assessment
› Vulnerabilities are a subset of weaknesses. 
› Almost all software analysis tools find 
weaknesses not vulnerabilities.
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What is an Exploit?
“The process of attacking a vulnerability in a 
program is called exploiting.”
The Art of Software Security Assessment
› Exploit: The attack can come from a program 
or script.
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What is a Threat?
“A potential cause of an incident, that may 
result in harm of systems and organization.” 
ISO 27005 
“Any circumstance or event with the potential to 
adversely impact organizational operations (including 
mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational 
assets, or individuals through an information system via 
unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, 
modification of information, and/or denial of service. 
Also, the potential for a threat-source to successfully 
exploit a particular information system vulnerability.”
NIST
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What is a Threat?
› Threat may come from many sources:
– External attackers.
– Legitimate users.
– Service providers.
– Technical failure.
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What is a Threat?
Risk factor = impact x likelihood
› New SW installed leads to security problems.
› Incident due to exploiting a vulnerability in 
third party SW.
› Insufficient staff to carry out security 
activities.
› Threats to user credentials.
› Management approving an activity which 
causes security problems. 
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What is a Threat?
› Insecure network architecture.
› Trusted staff may inadvertently release 
sensitive information.
› Authentication and authorization 
infrastructure compromised.
› Loss of essential IT services.
› Resources used for attacks to external 
parties.
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Cost of Insufficient Security
› Attacks are expensive and affect 
assets:
– Management.
– Organization.
– Process.
– Information and data.
– Software and applications.
– Infrastructure.
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Cost of Insufficient Security
› Attacks are expensive and affect 
assets:
– Financial capital.
– Reputation.
– Intellectual property.
– Network resources.
– Digital identities.
– Services.
Thinking about an Attack:
Owning the Bits
“Dark Arts”
and
“Defense Against the Dark Arts”
20
Learn to Think Like an Attacker
21
An Exploit through the Eyes of an Attacker
Exploit, redefined:
– A manipulation of a program’s internal state in a way 
not anticipated (or desired) by the programmer.
Start at the user’s entry point to the program: the 
attack surface:
– Network input buffer
– Field in a form
– Line in an input file
– Environment variable
– Program option
– Entry in a database
– … 
Attack surface: the set of points in the program’s 
interface that can be controlled by the user.
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The Path of an Attack
p = requesttable;
while (p != (struct table *)0)
{
if (p->entrytype == PEER_MEET)
{
found = (!(strcmp (her, p->me)) &&
!(strcmp (me, p->her)));
}
else if (p->entrytype == PUTSERVER)
{
found = !(strcmp (her, p->me));
}
if (found)
return (p);
else
p = p->next;
}
return ((struct table *) 0);
An Exploit through the Eyes of an Attacker
Follow the data and control flow through the 
program, observing what state you can control:
– Control flow: what branching and calling paths are 
affected by the data originating at the attack surface?
– Data flow: what variables have all or part of their value 
determined by data originating at the attack surface?
Sometimes it’s a combination:
if (inputbuffer[1] == 'a')
val = 3;
else
val = 25;
val is dependent on inputbuffer[1] even though it’s 
not directly assigned.
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The Path of an Attack
p = requesttable;
while (p != (struct table *)0)
{
if (p->entrytype == PEER_MEET)
{
found = (!(strcmp (her, p->me)) &&
!(strcmp (me, p->her)));
}
else if (p->entrytype == PUTSERVER)
{
found = !(strcmp (her, p->me));
}
if (found)
return (p);
else
p = p->next;
}
return ((struct table *) 0);
An Exploit through the Eyes of an Attacker
The goal is to end up at points in the program 
where the attacker can override the intended 
purpose. These points are the impact surface:
– Unconstrained execution (e.g., exec’ing a shell)
– Privilege escalation
– Inappropriate access to a resource
– Acting as an imposter
– Forwarding an attack
– Revealing confidential information
– … 
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The Path of an Attack
p = requesttable;
while (p != (struct table *)0)
{
if (p->entrytype == PEER_MEET)
{
found = (!(strcmp (buf, p->me)) &&
!(strcmp (me, p->her)));
}
else if (p->entrytype == PUTSERVER)
{
found = !(strcmp (buf, p->me));
}
if (found)
return (p);
else
p = p->next;
}
return ((struct table *) 0);
buffer[100]
<ret addr>
The Classic: A Stack Smash
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int foo()
{
char buffer[100];
int i, j;
…
gets(buffer);
…
return(strlen(buffer));
}
j
i
<evil addr>
jmp <evil addr>
An Exploit through the Eyes of an Attacker
The stack smashing example is a simple and 
obvious one:
– The input directly modified the target internal state...
... no dependence on complex control or data flows.
– The attacker owned all the target bits, so had complete 
control over the destination address.
– No randomization
– No internal consistency checks
– No modern OS memory protection
– No timing issues or races
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Evaluation: Finding Bits to Own
So, how do you find vulnerabilities in the face of these 
complexities?
– Complex flows:
• Taint analysis: execute program in special simulation that 
tracks data from input buffers through execution, marking all 
the data and control-flow decisions affected by the data.
• Fuzz testing: using unstructured or partially structured 
random input to try to crash the program.
Reliability is the foundation of security.
We’ll talk more about fuzzing towards the end of the class.
– Randomness:
• Repeated attempts: Sometimes patience is all that you need.
• Grooming: A sequence of operations that bring the program to 
a known state, e.g.:
– Cause a library to be loaded at a known address.
– Cause the heap to start allocating at a know address.
– Heap sprays: repeated patterns of code/data written to the heap so that at 
least one copy is in a useful place.
30
bpm1
Thinking Like an Analyst
31
Things That We All Know
› All software has vulnerabilities.
› Critical infrastructure software is 
complex and large.
› Vulnerabilities can be exploited by both 
authorized users and by outsiders.
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Key Issues for Security
› Need independent assessment
– Software engineers have long known 
that testing groups must be 
independent of development groups
› Need an assessment process that is NOT 
based on known vulnerabilities
– Such approaches will not find new 
types and variations of attacks
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Key Issues for Security
› Automated Analysis Tools have Serious 
Limitations:
– While they help find some local errors, 
they
• MISS significant vulnerabilities (false 
negatives)
• Produce voluminous reports (false 
positives)
› Programmers must be security-aware
– Designing for security and the use of 
secure practices and standards does 
not guarantee security.
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Addressing these Issues
› We must evaluate the security of our code
– The vulnerabilities are there and we 
want to find them first.
› Assessment isn’t cheap
– Automated tools create an illusion of 
security.
› You can’t take shortcuts 
– Even if the development team is good at 
testing, they can’t do an effective 
assessment of their own code.
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Addressing these Issues
› Try First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
– A strategy that focuses on critical 
resources .
– A strategy that is not based on known 
vulnerabilities.
› We need to integrate assessment and 
remediation into the software development 
process.
– We have to be prepared to respond to the 
vulnerabilities we find.
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First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Understanding the System
Step 1: Architectural Analysis
– Functionality and structure of the 
system, major components (modules, 
threads, processes), communication 
channels. 
– Interactions among components and 
with users.
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First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Step 1: Architectural Analysis
OS privileges master
Condor Submit Host
schedd
submit
4. submit job
condor
user
root
procd
3. create procd
startd
starter
user job
6. exec user job
Condor Execute Host
master
switchboard
procd
1. create sw
2. exec procd
switchboard
procd
4. create starter3. create sw
4. exec procd
2. create startd
switchboard
5. create sw
procd
1. create procd 2. create schedd
process
creation
comm
through
named
pipes
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First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Understanding the System
Step 2: Resource Identification
– Key resources accessed by each component.
– Operations allowed on those resources.
Step 3: Trust & Privilege Analysis
– How components are protected and who can 
access them.
– Privilege level at which each component runs.
– Trust delegation.
40
First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Step 2: Resource Identification
Switchboard
Config File
generic 
Condor 
daemon
Condor Execute Host
Condor 
Libraries
etc
Operational
Data &
Run-time
Config Files
spool log
Condor 
Binaries
Procd
Named 
pipes
Procd Log
Files
Condor 
log files
User 1 dir User N dir
…
execute Job Execution
root directory
OS privileges 
condor user 1root user N
Condor
Config Files
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First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Search for Vulnerabilities
Step 4: Component Evaluation
– Examine critical components in depth.
– Guide search using:
Diagrams from steps 1-3.
Knowledge of vulnerabilities.
– Helped by Automated scanning tools (!)
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First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Taking Actions
Step 5:  Dissemination of Results
– Report vulnerabilities.
– Interaction with developers.
– Disclosure of vulnerabilities.
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First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Taking Actions
Step 5:  Dissemination of Results
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Secure Programming:
Roadmap
– Introduction
– Handling errors
– Pointers and Strings
– Numeric Errors
– Race Conditions
– Exceptions
– Privilege, Sandboxing and Environment
– Injection Attacks
– Web Attacks
– Bad things
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Discussion of the Practices
• Description of vulnerability
• Signs of presence in the code
• Mitigations
• Safer alternatives
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Pointers and Strings
57
Buffer Overflows
http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2011/2011_cwe_sans_top25.html#Listing
1. Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL 
Command ('SQL Injection') 
2. Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS 
Command ('OS Command Injection') 
3. Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer 
Overflow') 
4. Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation 
('Cross-site Scripting') 
5. Missing Authentication for Critical Function 
6. Missing Authorization 
7. Use of Hard-coded Credentials 
8. Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data 
9. Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type 
10. Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
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Buffer Overflows
• Description
– Accessing locations of a buffer outside the boundaries 
of the buffer
• Common causes
– C-style strings
– Array access and pointer arithmetic in languages 
without bounds checking
– Off by one errors
– Fixed large buffer sizes (make it big and hope)
– Decoupled buffer pointer and its size
• If size unknown overflows are impossible to detect
• Require synchronization between the two
• Ok if size is implicitly known and every use knows it (hard)
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Why Buffer Overflows
are Dangerous
• An overflow overwrites memory adjacent 
to a buffer
• This memory could be
– Unused
– Code
– Program data that can affect operations
– Internal data used by the runtime system 
• Common result is a crash
• Specially crafted values can be used for an 
attack
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Buffer Overflow of User Data 
Affecting Flow of Control
char id[8];
int validId = 0;   /* not valid */
gets(id); /* reads "evillogin"*/
/* validId is now 110 decimal */
if (IsValid(id)) validId = 1; /* not true */
if (validId)                  /* is true  */
{DoPrivilegedOp();}   /* gets executed */
e v i l l o g i 110
‘n’
\0 \0 \0
id validId
\0 \0 \0 \0
id validId
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Buffer Overflow Danger Signs: 
Missing Buffer Size
• gets, getpass, getwd, and scanf family 
(with %s or %[…] specifiers without width)
– Impossible to use correctly: size comes solely 
from user input
– Source of the first (1987) stack smash attack.
– Alternatives:
Unsafe Safer
gets(s) fgets(s, sLen, stdin)
getcwd(s) getwd(s, sLen)
scanf("%s", s) scanf("%100s", s)
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strcat, strcpy, sprintf, 
vsprintf
– Impossible for function to detect overflow
• Destination buffer size not passed
– Difficult to use safely w/o pre-checks
• Checks require destination buffer size
• Length of data formatted by printf
• Difficult & error prone
• Best incorporated in a safe replacement function
Proper usage: concat s1, s2 into dst
If (dstSize < strlen(s1) + strlen(s2) + 1)
{ERROR("buffer overflow");}
strcpy(dst, s1);
strcat(dst, s2);
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Buffer Overflow Danger Signs: 
Difficult to Use and Truncation
• strncat(dst, src, n)
– n is the maximum number of chars of src to append 
(trailing null also appended)
– can overflow if   n >=(dstSize-strlen(dst))
• strncpy(dst, src, n)
– Writes n chars into dst, if strlen(src)<n, it fills the 
other n-strlen(src) chars with 0’s
– If strlen(src)>=n,  dst is not null terminated
• Truncation detection not provided
• Deceptively insecure
– Feels safer but requires same careful use as strcat
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Safer String Handling:
C-library functions
• snprintf(buf, bufSize, fmt, …) and 
vsnprintf
– Returns number of bytes, not including \0 that 
would’ve been written.
– Truncation detection possible
(result >= bufSize implies truncation)
– Use as safer version of strcpy and strcat
Proper usage: concat s1, s2 into dst
r = snprintf(dst, dstSize, "%s%s",s1, s2);
If (r >= dstSize)
{ERROR("truncation");}
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Attacks on Code Pointers
• Stack Smashing is an example
• There are many more pointers to functions or 
addresses in code
– Dispatch tables for libraries
– Return addresses
– Function pointers in code
– C++ vtables
– jmp_buf
– atexit
– Exception handling run-time
– Internal heap run-time data structures
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Buffer Overflow of a
User Pointer
{
char id[8];
int (*logFunc)(char*) = MyLogger;
gets(id); /* reads "evilguyx “ */
/* equivalent to system(userMsg) */
logFunc(userMsg);
e v i l g u y x
id logFunc
id logFunc
Ptr to MyLogger
Ptr to system
Ptr to system
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Buffer Overflow Danger Signs:
• unsafe
– Unverifiable code.
– Compiled with /unsafe flag.
unsafe static void SquarePtrParam(int* p) {
*p *= *p;
}
unsafe static void Main() {
int i = 5;
SquarePtrParam(&i);  // call to unsafe method
Console.WriteLine(i);
}
http://msdn.microsoft.com/es-es/library/chfa2zb8%28v=vs.90%29.aspx
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Buffer Overflow
Some people believe that buffer overflows 
are ancient history  … 
Heartbleed:
• Failure of the OpenSSL library to validate the length field 
(as compared to the size of the actual message).
• The heartbeat protocol is supposed to echo back the data 
sent in the request where the amount is given by the 
payload length.
• Since the length field is not checked, memcpy can read up 
to 64KB of memory.
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
Length field. Supplied by
an untrusted source.
Source. Buffer with t e
heartbeat record. 
Improperly used.
Destination. Allocated, 
used, and freed.  OK.
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Buffer Overflow
Some people believe that buffer overflows 
are ancient history  … 
Heartbleed:
• Failure of the OpenSSL library to validate the length field 
(as compared to the size of the actual message).
• The heartbeat protocol is supposed to echo back the data 
sent in the request where the amount is given by the 
payload length.
• Since the length field is not checked, memcpy can read up 
to 64KB of memory.
… but they would be wrong.
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Buffer Overflow
Validation to remediate Heartbleed
Read type and payload length
if (1+2+payload+16)>InputLength)
return 0 // silently discard
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Numeric Errors
74
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Integer Vulnerabilities
• Description
– Many programming languages allow silent loss of 
integer data without warning due to
• Overflow
• Truncation
• Signed vs. unsigned representations
– Code may be secure on one platform, but silently 
vulnerable on another, due to different underlying 
integer types.
• General causes
– Not checking for overflow
– Mixing integer types of different ranges
– Mixing unsigned and signed integers
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Integer Danger Signs
• Mixing signed and unsigned integers
• Converting to a smaller integer
• Using a built-in type instead of the API’s 
typedef type
• However built-ins can be problematic too: 
size_t is unsigned, ptrdiff_t is signed
• Assigning values to a variable of the 
correct type before data validation 
(range/size check)
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Numeric Parsing
Unreported Errors
• atoi, atol, atof, scanf family (with %u, 
%i, %d, %x and %o specifiers)
– Out of range values results in unspecified 
behavior
– Non-numeric input returns 0
– Use strtol, strtoul, strtoll, strtoull, 
strtof, strtod, strtold which allow error 
detection
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Numeric Error
• unchecked to bypass integer overflow 
control.
const int x = 2147483647;   // Max int
const int y = 2;
static void UnCheckedMethod() {
int z;
unchecked {
z = x * y;
}
Console.WriteLine("Unchecked output value: {0}", z);
}
http://msdn.microsoft.com/es-es/library/a569z7k8%28v=vs.90%29.aspx
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Numeric Error Mitigation
• checked to control integer overflow.
static short x = 32767;   // Max short value
static short y = 32767;
static int CheckedMethod() {
int z = 0;
try {
z = checked((short)(x + y));
}
catch (System.OverflowException e) {
Console.WriteLine(e.ToString());
}
return z;
} http://msdn.microsoft.com/es-es/library/74b4xzyw%28v=vs.90%29.aspx
Integer Mitigations
• Use correct types, before validation
• Validate range of data
• Add code to check for overflow, or use safe 
integer libraries or large integer libraries
• Not mixing signed and unsigned integers in a 
computation
• Compiler options for signed integer run-time 
exceptions, and integer warnings
• Use strtol, strtoul, strtoll, strtoull, 
strtof, strtod, strtold, which allow error 
detection
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The Cost of Not Checking…
4 Jun 1996:
81
An unchecked 64 bit floating point 
number assigned to a 16 bit integer
Cost: Development cost: $7 billion
Lost rocket and payload $500 million
Ariane 5 mission 501
82
Race Conditions
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Race Conditions
• Description
– A race condition occurs when multiple threads of 
control try to perform a non-atomic operation on a 
shared object, such as
• Multithreaded applications accessing shared data
• Accessing external shared resources such as the file system
• General causes
– Threads or signal handlers without proper 
synchronization
– Non-reentrant functions (may have shared variables)
– Performing non-atomic sequences of operations on 
shared resources (file system, shared memory) and 
assuming they are atomic
84
Race Condition on Data
• A program contains a data race if two threads 
simultaneously access the same variable, where 
at least one of these accesses is a write.
• Programs need to be race free to be safe.
Successful Race Condition Attack
void TransFunds(Account srcAcct, Account dstAcct, int xfrAmt)  
{
if (xfrAmt < 0)
FatalError();
int srcAmt = srcAcct.getBal();
if (srcAmt - xfrAmt < 0)
FatalError();
srcAcct.setBal(srcAmt - xfrAmt);
dstAcct.setBal(dstAcct.getBal() + xfrAmt);
}
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Balances
Thread 1 Thread 2 Bob Ian
XfrFunds(Bob, Ian, 100) XfrFunds(Bob, Ian, 100) 100 0
srcAmt = 100
srcAmt = 100
srcAmt – 100 < 0 ?
srcAmt – 100 < 0 ?
srcAcct.setBal(100 – 100) 0
srcAcct.setBal(100 – 100) 0
dst.setBal(0 + 100) 100
dst.setBal(0 + 100) 200
time
Mitigated Race Condition Attack
public void TransFunds(Account srcAcct, Account dstAcct, int xfrAmt)  
{     
if (xfrAmt < 0)  FatalError();
synchronized(srcAcct) { 
int srcAmt = srcAcct.getBal();
if (srcAmt - xfrAmt < 0)
FatalError();
srcAcct.setBal(srcAmt - xfrAmt);
} 
synchronized(dstAcct) { 
dstAcct.setBal(dstAcct.getBal() + xfrAmt);
}
}
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Thread 1 Thread 2 Bob Ian
XfrFunds(Bob, Ian, 100) XfrFunds(Bob, Ian, 100) 100 0
In use srcAcct? No, proceed.
In use srcAcct? Yes, wait.
srcAmt = 100
srcAmt – 100 < 0 ?
srcAcct.setBal(100 – 100) 0
In use dstAcct? No, proceed.
dst.setBal(0 + 100)
srcAmt = 0
srcAmt – 100 < 0? Yes, fail 100
time
Mitigated Race Condition Attack
public void TransFunds(Account srcAcct,
Account dstAcct, 
int xfrAmt)  {
if (xfrAmt < 0)
FatalError();
lock (srcAcct) { 
int srcAmt = srcAcct.getBal();
if (srcAmt - xfrAmt < 0)
FatalError();
srcAcct.setBal(srcAmt - xfrAmt);
} 
lock (dstAcct) { 
dstAcct.setBal(dstAcct.getBal() + xfrAmt);
}
}
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File System Race Conditions
• A file system maps a path name of a file or other 
object in the file system, to the internal identifier 
(device and inode)
• If an attacker can control any component of the 
path, multiple uses of a path can result in 
different file system objects
• Safe use of path
– eliminate race condition
• use only once
• use file descriptor for all other uses
– verify multiple uses are consistent
File System Race Examples
• Check properties of a file then open
Bad:   access or stat Î open
Safe:  open Î fstat
• Create file if it doesn’t exist
Bad:   if stat fails Î creat(fn, mode)
Safe:  open(fn, O_CREAT|O_EXCL, mode)
– Never use O_CREAT without O_EXCL
– Better still use safefile library
• http://www.cs.wisc.edu/mist/safefile
James A. Kupsch and Barton P. Miller, “How to Open a File and Not Get 
Hacked,” 2008 Third International Conference on Availability, Reliability and 
Security (ARES), Barcelona, Spain, March 2008.
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Race Condition File Attributes
• Using the path to create or open a file and 
then using the same path to change the 
ownership or mode of the file
– Best to create the file with the correct owner 
group and mode at creation
– Otherwise the file should be created with 
restricted permissions and then changed to 
less restrictive using fchown and fchmod
– If created with lax permissions there is a race 
condition between the attacker opening the file 
and permissions being changed
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Race Condition Saving Directory 
and Returning
• There is a need to save the current working 
directory, chdir somewhere else, and chdir
back to original directory
• Insecure pattern is to use getwd, and chdir to 
value returned
– getwd could fail
– Path not guaranteed to be the same directory
• Safe method is get a file descriptor to the 
directory and to use fchdir to go back
savedDir = open(".", O_RDONLY);
chdir(newDir);
… Do work …
fchdir(savedDir);
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Race Condition Temporary Files
• mktemp, tmpnam, or tempnam, then open
– Return filename that does not exist
– a race condition exists if O_EXCL is not used
• Use mkstemp which returns the filename and a 
file descriptor to the opened file (use umask to 
restrict privileges)
• To create a directory use mkdtemp if available or 
the following:
for (int j = 0; j < 10; ++j)  {
strcpy(path, template);
if (mktemp(path) == NULL)  {ERROR("mktemp failed");}
if (mkdir(path) != -1 || errno != EEXIST)  {
break;
}
}
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Race Condition Examples
• Your Actions Attackers Action
s=strdup("/tmp/zXXXXXX")
tempnam(s)
// s now "/tmp/zRANDOM" link = "/etc/passwd"
file = "/tmp/zRANDOM"
symlink(link, file)
f = fopen(s, "w+")
// writes now update
// /etc/passwd
time
Safe Version
fd = mkstemp(s)
f = fdopen(fd, "w+")
100
Exceptions
101
Exception Vulnerabilities
• Exception are a nonlocal control flow 
mechanism, usually used to propagate  error 
conditions in languages such as Java and C++.
try {
// code that generates exception
} catch (Exception e) {
// perform cleanup and error recovery
}
• Common Vulnerabilities include:
– Ignoring (program terminates)
– Suppression (catch, but do not handled)
– Information leaks (sensitive information in error 
messages)
Proper Use of Exceptions
• Add proper exception handling
– Handle expected exceptions (i.e. check for errors)
– Don’t suppress:
• Do not catch just to make them go away
• Recover from the error or rethrow exception
– Include top level exception handler to avoid exiting:  
catch, log, and restart
• Do not disclose sensitive information in messages
– Only report non-sensitive data
– Log sensitive data to secure store, return id of data
– Don't report unnecessary sensitive internal state
• Stack traces
• Variable values
• Configuration data
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Exception Suppression
1. User sends malicious data
boolean Login(String user, String pwd){
boolean loggedIn = true;
String realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);
try {
if (!GetMd5(pwd).equals(realPwd)) 
{
loggedIn = false;
}
} catch (Exception e) {
//this can not happen, ignore
}
return loggedIn;
}
user=“admin”,pwd=null
2. System grants access Login() returns true
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Unusual or Exceptional 
Conditions Mitigation
boolean Login(String user, String pwd){
boolean loggedIn = true;
String realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);
try {
if (!GetMd5(pwd).equals(realPwd)) 
{
loggedIn = false;
}
} catch (Exception e) {
loggedIn = false;
}
return loggedIn;
}
2. System does not grant access Login() returns false
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1. User sends malicious data user=“admin”,pwd=null
WTMI (Way Too Much Info)
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Login(… user, … pwd)  {
try {
ValidatePwd(user, pwd);
} catch (Exception e) {
print("Login failed.\n");
print(e + "\n");
e.printStackTrace();
return;
}
}
void ValidatePwd(… user, … pwd)
throws BadUser, BadPwd  {
realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);
if (realPwd == null)
throw BadUser("user=" + user);
if (!pwd.equals(realPwd))
throw BadPwd("user=" + user
+ " pwd=" + pwd
+ " expected=" + realPwd);
…
Login failed.
BadPwd: user=bob pwd=x expected=password
BadPwd:
at Auth.ValidatePwd (Auth.java:92)
at Auth.Login (Auth.java:197)
… 
com.foo.BadFramework(BadFramework.java:71)
...
User exists Entered pwd
User's actual password ?!?
(passwords aren't hashed)
Reveals internal structure
(libraries used, call structure, 
version information)
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WTMI (Way Too Much Info)
#!/usr/bin/ruby
def ValidatePwd(user, password)
if wrong password
raise “Bad passwd for user #{user} expected #{password}”
end
end
def Login(user, password) 
ValidatePwd(user, password);
rescue Exception => e
puts “Login failed”
puts e.message
puts e.backtrace.inspect
end
Login failed.
Bad password for user Elisa expected pwd
["./test3:4:in `ValidatePwd'", "./test3:8:in `Login'", "./test3:15"] 
User exists
User's actual password ?!?
Reveals internal structure
The Right Amount of Information
107
Login {
try {
ValidatePwd(user, pwd);
} catch (Exception e) {
logId = LogError(e);  // write exception and return log ID.
print("Login failed, username or password is invalid.\n");
print("Contact support referencing problem id " + logId
+ " if the problem persists");
return;   
}
}
void ValidatePwd(… user, … pwd) throws BadUser, BadPwd  {
realPwdHash = GetPwdHashFromDb(user)
if (realPwdHash == null)
throw BadUser("user=" + HashUser(user));
if (!HashPwd(user, pwd).equals(realPwdHash))
throw BadPwdExcept("user=" + HashUser(user));
…
}
Log sensitive information
Generic error message
(id links sensitive information)
User and password are hashed
(minimizes damage if  breached)
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Serialization
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Data Serialization Problem
Host A Host B
Network
110
Data Serialization
Host A Host B
Network
Serialization Deserialization
ac ed 00 05
74 00 05 54
6f  64 61 79
ac ed 00 05
74 00 05 54
6f  64 61 79
Standard 
representation
with sufficient info
to restore the
original object
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Data serialization
• Protocol for converting objects into a stream of 
bytes to be:
– Stored in a file.
– Transmitted across a network.
• The serialized form contains sufficient 
information to restore the original object.
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Data serialization
Language Serializing Deserializing
Java Method: writeObject()
Implemented in:
ObjectOutputStream
Method: readObject()
Implemented in:
ObjectInputStream
Python pickle.dumps(…) pickle.loads(…) 
Ruby Marshal.dump(…) Marshal.load(…)
C++ -- Boost boost::archive::text_oa
rchive oa (filename);
oa << data;
Invokes the serialize()
class.
boost::archive::text_ia
rchive ia(filename); 
ia >> newdata;
Invokes the serialize()
class.
MFC – Microsoft 
Fundation Class
Library
• Derive your Class from CObject.
• Override the Serialize Member Function.
• IsStoring() indicates if Serialize is storing or 
loading data.
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Data serialization
– Risks
• Trusting serialized data with questionable
provenance
– Attack to the integrity of serialized data.
– Deserializing data received from an external source 
(untrusted or unauthenticated).
– Result
• Correctness errors
• Corrupting objects by deserializing untrusted data.
• Security problems.
Successful Command Injection Attack 
via Serialization
1. Client pickles malicious data
3. Server executes rm –r /*
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line = skt.recv(1024)
obj = pickle.loads(line)
class payload(object):
def __reduce__(self):
return (os.system, (‘rm –r /*’,),)
payload = pickle.dumps(payload())
…
soc.send(payload)
2. Server unpickles random data
Successful Command Injection Attack 
via Serialization
1. Client pickles malicious data
3. Server executes /bin/sh
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line = skt.recv(1024)
obj = pickle.loads(line)
class payload(object):
def __reduce__(self):
return (subprocess.Popen, (‘/bin/sh’,),)
payload = pickle.dumps(payload())
…
soc.send(payload)
2. Server unpickles random data
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Serialization. Remediation
– Prevent serailization if possible, especially of 
sensitive data.
– Write a class-specific serialization method which 
does not write sensitive fields to the serialization 
stream.
– Do not serialize untrusted data.
– Serialized data should be stored securely, protected
or encrypted.
– Sanitize deserialized data in a temporal object.
– Deserailized data should be treated as untrusted
input.
Layered, onion-like trust model.  The more you do, the
more secure you are. 
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Privilege, Sandboxing, 
and Environment
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Not Dropping Privilege
• Description
– When a program running with a privileged status 
(running as root for instance), creates a process or 
tries to access resources as another user 
• General causes
– Running with elevated privilege
– Not dropping all inheritable process attributes such as 
uid, gid, euid, egid, supplementary groups, open file 
descriptors, root directory, working directory
– not setting close-on-exec on sensitive file descriptors
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Not Dropping Privilege: chroot
• chroot changes the root directory for the 
process, files outside cannot be accessed
• Only root can use chroot
• chdir needs to follow chroot, otherwise 
relative pathnames are not restricted
• Need to recreate all support files used by 
program in new root: /etc, libraries, …
Makes chroot difficult to use.
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Trusted Directory
• A trusted directory is one where only trusted 
users can update the contents of anything in the 
directory or any of its ancestors all the way to the 
root
• A trusted path needs to check all components of 
the path including symbolic links referents for 
trust
• A trusted path is immune to TOCTOU attacks 
from untrusted users
• This is extremely tricky to get right!
• safefile library
– http://www.cs.wisc.edu/mist/safefile
– Determines trust based on trusted users & groups
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Directory Traversal
• Description
– When user data is used to create a pathname to a file 
system object that is supposed to be restricted to a 
particular set of paths or path prefixes, but which the 
user can circumvent
• General causes
– Not checking for path components that are empty, "."
or ".."
– Not creating the canonical form of the pathname (there 
is an infinite number of distinct strings for the same 
object)
– Not accounting for symbolic links
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Directory Traversal Mitigation
• Use realpath or something similar to 
create canonical pathnames
• Use the canonical pathname when 
comparing filenames or prefixes
• If using prefix matching to check if a path is 
within directory tree, also check that the 
next character in the path is the directory 
separator or '\0'
Directory Traversal
(Path Injection)
• User supplied data is used to create a path, and program security 
requires  but does not verify that the path is in a particular subtree of 
the directory  structure, allowing unintended access to files and 
directories that can compromise the security of the system.
– Usually <program-defined-path-prefix> + "/" + <user-data>
• Mitigations
– Validate final path is in required directory using canonical paths 
(realpath)
– Do not allow above patterns to appear in user supplied part (if 
symbolic links exists in the safe directory tree, they can be used to 
escape)
– Use chroot or other OS mechanisms
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<user-data> Directory Movement
../ up
./ or empty string none
<dir>/ down
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Successful Directory 
Traversal  Attack
1. Users requests File="....//etc/passwd"
2. Server deletes /etc/passwd
String path = request.getParameter("file");
path = "/safedir/" + path;
// remove ../'s to prevent escaping out of /safedir
Replace(path, "../", "");
File f = new File(path);
f.delete();
Before Replace path = "/safedir/….//etc/passwd"
After Replace path = "/safedir/../etc/passwd"
Moral: Don't try to fix user input, verify and reject instead
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Mitigated Directory Traversal
1. Users requests file=“../etc/passwd”
2. Throws error /safedir/../etc/passwd is invalid
String file = request.getParameter(“file”);
if (file.length() == 0) {
throw new PathTraversalException(file + " is null");
}
File prefix = new File(new File("/safedir").getCanonicalPath());
File path = new File(prefix, file);
if(!path.getAbsolutePath().equals(path.getCanonicalPath())){
throw new PathTraversalException(path + " is invalid");
}
path.getAbsolutePath().delete();
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Command Line
• Description
– Convention is that argv[0] is the path to the 
executable
– Shells enforce this behavior, but it can be set 
to anything if you control the parent process
• General causes
– Using argv[0] as a path to find other files 
such as configuration data
– Process needs to be setuid or setgid to be a 
useful attack
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Command Line
Want to run:   ls –l foo
execlp(ʺ/bin/lsʺ, 
ʺ-lʺ,
ʺfooʺ,
NULL); 
argv[0]: usually the file name
executable name
argv[1]
end of  arguments
argv[2]
ʺ/bin/lsʺ, evilʺ, argv[0]: but could be anything
Some programs use this to find 
their config files:
/bin/ls.config
, now, we are using the co fig
fil  f om the attacker:
evil.config
Environment
• List of (name, value) string pairs
• Available to program to read
• Used by programs, libraries and runtime 
environment to affect program behavior
• Mitigations:
– Clean environment to just safe names & values
– Don’t assume the length of strings
– Avoid PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, and other 
variables that are directory lists used to look 
for execs and libs
130
131
Injection Attacks
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Injection Attacks
• Description
– A string constructed with user input, that is then 
interpreted by another function, where the string is not 
parsed as expected
• Command injection (in a shell)
• Format string attacks (in printf/scanf)
• SQL injection
• Cross-site scripting or XSS (in HTML)
• General causes
– Allowing metacharacters
– Not properly neutralizing user data if metacharacters
are allowed
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SQL Injections
• User supplied values used in SQL 
command must be validated, quoted, or 
prepared statements must be used
• Signs of vulnerability
– Uses a database mgmt system (DBMS)
– Creates SQL statements at run-time
– Inserts user supplied data directly into 
statement without validation
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SQL Injections:
attacks and mitigations
• Dynamically generated SQL without 
validation or quoting is vulnerable
$u = " '; drop table t --";
$sth = $dbh->do("select * from t where u = '$u'");
Database sees two statements:
select * from t where u = ' '; drop table t --'
• Use prepared statements to mitigate
$sth = $dbh->do("select * from t where u = ?", $u);
– SQL statement template and value sent to 
database
– No mismatch between intention and use
Successful SQL Injection Attack
1. User sends malicious data
boolean Login(String user, String pwd)  {
boolean loggedIn = false;
conn = pool.getConnection( );
stmt = conn.createStatement();
rs = stmt.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM members"
+ "WHERE u='" + user
+ "' AND p='" + pwd + "'");
if (rs.next())
loggedIn = true;
}
user="admin"; pwd="'OR 'x'='x"
4. System grants access Login() returns true
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SELECT * FROM members 
WHERE u='admin' AND p='' OR 'x'='x'
2. DB Queried
3. Returns all row of table members
Mitigated SQL Injection Attack
1. User sends malicious data
boolean Login(String user, String pwd)  {
boolean loggedIn = false;
conn = pool.getConnection( );
PreparedStatement pstmt = conn.prepareStatement(
"SELECT * FROM members WHERE u = ? AND p = ?");
pstmt.setString( 1, user);
pstmt.setString( 2, pwd);
ResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );
if (rs.next())
loggedIn = true;
}
user="admin"; pwd="' OR 'x'='x"
4. System does not grant access Login() returns false
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SELECT * FROM members WHERE u = ?1 AND p = ?2
?1 = "admin" ?2 = "' OR 'x'='x"
2. DB Queried 3. Returns null set
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http://xkcd.com/327
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Command Injections
• User supplied data used to create a string 
that is the interpreted by command shell such 
as /bin/sh
• Signs of vulnerability
– Use of popen, or system
– exec of a shell such as sh, or csh
– Argument injections, allowing arguments to begin 
with "-" can be dangerous
• Usually done to start another program
– That has no C API
– Out of laziness
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Command Injection Mitigations
• Check user input for metacharacters
• Neutralize those that can’t be eliminated or 
rejected
– replace single quotes with the four characters, '\'', 
and enclose each argument in single quotes
• Use fork, drop privileges and exec for more 
control
• Avoid if at all possible
• Use C API if possible
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Command Argument Injections
• A string formed from user supplied input 
that is used as a command line argument  
to another executable
• Does not attack shell, attacks command line of 
program started by shell
• Need to fully understand command line 
interface
• If value should not be an option
– Make sure it doesn't start with a -
– Place after an argument of -- if supported
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Command Argument
Injection Example
• Example
snprintf(userMsg, sSize, "/bin/mail -s hi %s", email);
M = popen(userMsg, "w");
fputs(userMsg, M);
pclose(M);
• If email is  -I , turns on interactive mode …
• … so can run arbitrary code by if userMsg
includes:   ~!cmd
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Perl Command Injection
Danger Signs
• open(F, $filename)
– Filename is a tiny language besides opening
• Open files in various modes
• Can start programs
•dup file descriptors
– If $filename is "rm -rf /|", you probably 
won’t like the result
– Use separate mode version of open to 
eliminate vulnerability
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Perl Command Injection
Danger Signs
• Vulnerable to shell interpretation
open(C, "$cmd|") open(C, "-|", $cmd)
open(C, "|$cmd") open(C, "|-", $cmd)
`$cmd` qx/$cmd/
system($cmd)
• Safe from shell interpretation
open(C, "-|", @argList)
open(C, "|-", @cmdList)
system(@argList)
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Perl Command Injection 
Examples
• open(CMD, "|/bin/mail -s $sub $to");
– Bad if $to is "badguy@evil.com; rm -rf /"
• open(CMD, “|/bin/mail -s '$sub' '$to'");
– Bad if $to is "badguy@evil.com'; rm -rf /'"
• ($qSub = $sub) =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
($qTo = $to)   =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
open(CMD, "|/bin/mail -s '$qSub' '$qTo'");
– Safe from command injection
• open(cmd, "|-", "/bin/mail", "-s", $sub, $to);
– Safe and simpler: use this whenever possible.
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Eval Injections
• A string formed from user supplied input that is 
used as an argument that is interpreted by the 
language running the code
• Usually allowed in scripting languages such as 
Perl, sh and SQL
• In Perl eval($s) and s/$pat/$replace/ee
– $s and $replace are evaluated as perl code
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Rubi Command Injection
Danger Signs
– Functions prone to injection attacks:
•Kernel.system(os command)
•Kernel.exec(os command)
•`os command` # back tick operator
•%x[os command]
•eval(ruby code)
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Python Command Injection
Danger Signs
• Functions prone to injection attacks:
– exec() # dynamic execution of Python code
– eval() # returns the value of an expression or    
#  code object
– os.system() # execute a command in a subshell
– os.popen() # open a pipe to/from a command
– execfile() # reads & executes Python script from 
# a file.
– input() # equivalent to eval(raw_input())
– compile() # compile the source string into a code 
#  object that can be executed
Successful OS Injection Attack
1. User sends malicious data
3. System executes nslookup x.com;rm –rf /*
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String rDomainName(String hostname)  {
…
String cmd = "/usr/bin/nslookup " + hostname;
Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
…
hostname="x.com;rm –rf /*"
2. Application uses nslookup to get DNS records
4. All files possible are deleted
Mitigated OS Injection Attack
3. System returns error "Invalid host name"
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String rDomainName(String hostname)  {
…
if (hostname.matches("[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9.-]*")) {
String cmd = "/usr/bin/nslookup " + hostname);
Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
} else {
System.out.println(“Invalid host name”);
…
1. User sends malicious data
hostname="x.com;rm –rf /*"
2. Application uses nslookup only if input validates
152
Format String Injections
• User supplied data used to create format strings 
in scanf or printf
• printf(userData) is insecure
– %n can be used to write memory
– large field width values can be used to create a denial 
of service attack
– Safe to use printf("%s", userData) or 
fputs(userData, stdout)
• scanf(userData, …) allows arbitrary writes to 
memory pointed to by stack values
• ISO/IEC 24731 does not allow %n
Code Injection
• Cause
– Program generates source code from template
– User supplied data is injected in template
– Failure to neutralized user supplied data
• Proper quoting or escaping
• Only allowing expected data
– Source code compiled and executed
• Very dangerous – high consequences for 
getting it wrong: arbitrary code execution
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Code Injection Vulnerability
%data = ReadLogFile('logfile');
PH = open("|/usr/bin/python");
print PH "import LogIt\n";w
while (($k, $v) = (each %data)) {
if ($k eq 'name')  {
print PH "LogIt.Name('$v')";
}
2. Perl log processing code – uses Python to do real work
name = John Smith
name = ');import os;os.system('evilprog');#
1. logfile – name's value is user controlled
import LogIt;
LogIt.Name('John Smith')
LogIt.Name('');import os;os.system('evilprog');#')
3. Python source executed – 2nd LogIt executes arbitrary code
Start Python,
program sent
on stdin
Read
logfile
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Code Injection Mitigated
%data = ReadLogFile('logfile');
PH = open("|/usr/bin/python");
print PH "import LogIt\n";w
while (($k, $v) = (each %data)) {
if ($k eq 'name')  {
$q = QuotePyString($v);
print PH "LogIt.Name($q)";
}
2. Perl log processing code – use QuotePyString to safely create string literal
name = John Smith
name = ');import os;os.system('evilprog');#
1. logfile – name's value is user controlled
import LogIt;
LogIt.Name('John Smith')
LogIt.Name('\');import os;os.system(\'evilprog\');#')
3. Python source executed – 2nd LogIt is now safe
sub QuotePyString {
my $s = shift;
$s =~ s/\\/\\\\/g;   # \ Î \\
$s =~ s/\n/\\n/g;    # NL Î \n
return "'$s'";       # add quotes
}
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Safe DNS
Reverse DNS Lookup
Problem: A server trying to determine of the client is 
from an appropriate domain.
Common solution: Look at the IP address for the other 
end of the socket, then do a reverse DNS lookup 
(RARP) on that address.
Risk: The RARP query goes to the server run by the 
owner of the IP address, and they can respond with 
anything they want.
Solution: After doing the RARP lookup, a DNS lookup 
(ARP) on the name returned and see if it matches the 
original IP address.
(All this assumes that you trust DNS in the first place!)
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char *safe_reverse_lookup(struct in_addr *ip)
{
struct hostent *hp;
if ((hp=gethostbyaddr(ip,sizeof *ip AF_INET)) == NULL)
return NULL;
char *name = strdup(hp->h_name);
if ((hp = gethostbyname(name)) == NULL) {
free(name);
return NULL;
}
char **p = hp->h_addr_list;
while (*p) {
if (!memcmp(ip, *p, hp->h_length)) return name;
++p;
}
free(name);
return NULL;
} 
save name
do reverse lookup
do forward lookup
check if  IP address matches original
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Web Attacks
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Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
• Injection into an HTML page
– HTML tags
– JavaScript code
• Reflected (from URL) or
persistent (stored from prior attacker visit)
• Web application fails to neutralize special characters in 
user supplied data
• Mitigate by preventing or encoding/escaping special 
characters
• Special characters and encoding depends on context
– HTML text
– HTML tag attribute
– HTML URL
161
Reflected Cross Site Scripting 
(XSS)
•••
String query = request.getParameter("q");
if (query != null) {
out.writeln("You searched for:\n" + query);
}
•••
<html>
•••
You searched for:
widget
•••
</html>
http://example.com?q=widget
3. Generated HTML displayed by browser
1. Browser sends request to web server
2. Web server code handles request
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Reflected Cross Site Scripting 
(XSS)   
•••
String query = request.getParameter("q");
if (query != null) {
out.writeln("You searched for:\n" + query);
}
•••
<html>
•••
You searched for:
<script>alert('Boo!')</script>
•••
</html>
http://example.com?q=<script>alert('Boo!')</script>
3. Generated HTML displayed by browser
1. Browser sends request to web server
2. Web server code handles request
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XSS Mitigation
•••
String query = request.getParameter("q");
if (query != null) {
if (query.matches("^\\w*$"))  {
out.writeln("You searched for:\n" + query);
}  else  {
out.writeln("Invalid query");
}
}
•••
<html>
•••
Invalid query
•••
</html>
http://example.com?q=<script>alert('Boo!')</script>
3. Generated HTML displayed by browser
1. Browser sends request to web server
2. Web server code correctly handles request
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Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
• CSRF is when loading a web pages causes a malicious 
request to another server
• Requests made using URLs or forms (also transmits any 
cookies for the site, such as session or auth cookies)
– http://bank.com/xfer?amt=1000&toAcct=joe HTTP GET method
– <form action=/xfer method=POST> HTTP POST method
<input type=text name=amt>
<input type=text name=toAcct>
</form>
• Web application fails to distinguish between a user 
initiated request and an attack
• Mitigate by using a large random nonce
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Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
1. User loads bad page from web server
– XSS – Fake server
– Bad guy’s server – Compromised server
2. Web browser makes a request to the victim web server 
directed by bad page
– Tags such as 
<img src=‘http://bank.com/xfer?amt=1000&toAcct=evil37’>
– JavaScript
3. Victim web server processes request and assumes 
request from browser is valid
– Session IDs in cookies are automatically sent along
SSL does not help – channel security is not an issue here
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Successful CSRF Attack
•••
String id = response.getCookie(“user”);
userAcct = GetAcct(id);
If (userAcct != null)  {
deposits.xfer(userAcct, toAcct, amount);
}
<html>
•••
<img src=‘http://bank.com/xfer?amt=1000&toAcct=evil37’>
•••
</html>
http://bank.com/xfer?amt=1000&toAcct=evil37
2. evil.com returns HTML
3. Browser sends attack
4. bank.com server code handles request
http://evil.com
1. User visits evil.com
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CSRF Mitigation
•••
String nonce = (String)session.getAttribute(“nonce”);
String id = response.getCookie(“user”);
if (Utils.isEmpty(nonce)
|| !nonce.equals(getParameter(“nonce”)  {
Login(); // no nonce or bad nonce, force login
return;   //    do NOT perform request
}             // nonce added to all URLs and forms
userAcct = GetAcct(id);
if (userAcct != null)  {
deposits.xfer(userAcct, toAcct, amount);
}
2. evil.com returns HTML
3. Browser sends attack 4. bank.com server code correctly handles request
1. User visits evil.com Very unlikely 
attacker will 
provide correct 
nonce 
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Successful Weak Server Side Control
<html>
•••
<a href=“javascript:location=‘cookiestealer.php?
cookie=’+document.cookie”> Advertisement link </a>
•••
</html>
$cookie=$HTTP_GET_VARS[“cookie”];
fwrite($file,$cookie);  // session=sensitive_val
2. Web page  contains a malicious 
link
3. Cookies stealer script
cookieManager.setCookie(domain,“session=sensitive_val”);
webView.loadUrl(“url_goes_here”);
webView.setJavascriptEnables(true);
webView.setWebViewClient(new WebViewClient());
1. Android activity sets session cookies and loads URL
Mitigated Weak Server Side Control
webView.setWebViewClient(new WebViewClient()){
pubic shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView wV, String url){
// Checksum on url
wV.loadUrl(url);
}
}
Implement checksum on WebView.Load URL
webView.setJavascriptEnabled(false);
Disable Javascript
Option 1:
Option 2:
Session Hijacking
• Session IDs identify a user’s session in 
web applications.
• Obtaining the session ID allows 
impersonation
• Attack vectors:
– Intercept the traffic that contains the ID value
– Guess a valid ID value (weak randomness)
– Discover other logic flaws in the sessions 
handling process
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Good Session ID Properties
• Hard to guess
– Large entropy (big random number)
– No patterns in IDs issued
• No reuse
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http://xkcd.com/221
Session Hijacking Mitigation
• Create new session id after
– Authentication
– switching encryption on
– other attributes indicate a host change (IP address 
change)
• Encrypt to prevent obtaining session ID through 
eavesdropping 
• Expire IDs after short inactivity to limit exposure of 
guessing or reuse of illicitly obtained IDs
• Entropy should be large to prevent guessing
• Invalidate session IDs on logout and provide logout 
functionality
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Session Hijacking Example
1. An insecure web application accepts and 
reuses a session ID supplied to a login page.
2. Attacker tricked user visits the web site 
using attacker chosen session ID
3. User logs in to the application
4. Application creates a session using attacker 
supplied session ID to identify the user
5. The attacker uses session ID to impersonate 
the user
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Successful Hijacking Attack
1. Tricks user to visit
if(HttpServletRequest.getRequestedSessionId() == null) 
{
HttpServletRequest.getSession(true);
}
...
http://bank.com/login;JSESSIONID=123
3. Creates the 
session
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie:
JSESSIONID=123
http://bank.com/login;JSESSIONID=123
2. User Logs In
http://bank.com/home
Cookie: JSESSIONID=123
4. Impersonates the user
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Mitigated Hijacking Attack
1. Tricks user to visit
HttpServletRequest.invalidate();
HttpServletRequest.getSession(true);
...
http://bank.com/login;JSESSIONID=123
3. Creates the 
session
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: 
JSESSIONID=XXX
http://bank.com/login;JSESSIONID=123
2. User Logs In
4. Impersonates the user
http://bank.com/home
Cookie: JSESSIONID=123
Open Redirect
(AKA: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site, and Unsafe URL Redirection)
• Description
– Web app redirects user to malicious site chosen 
by attacker
• URL parameter (reflected)
http://bank.com/redir?url=http://evil.com
• Previously stored in a database (persistent)
– User may think they are still at safe site
– Web app uses user supplied data in redirect URL
• Mitigations
– Use white list of tokens that map to acceptable 
redirect URLs
– Present URL and require explicit click to navigate 
to user supplied URLs
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Open Redirect Example
1. User receives phishing e-mail with URL
http://www.bank.com/redir?url=http://evil.com
2. User inspects URL, finds hostname valid for 
their bank
3. User clicks on URL
4. Bank’s web server returns a HTTP redirect 
response to malicious site
5. User’s web browser loads the malicious site 
that looks identical to the legitimate one
6. Attacker harvests user’s credentials or other 
information
177
178
Successful Open Redirect Attack
String url = request.getParameter("url");
if (url != null)  { 
response.sendRedirect( url );
}
http://bank.com/redir?url=http://evil.com2. Opens 
3. Web server redirects Location: http://evil.com
5. Browser displays forgery
<h1>Welcome to bank.com<h1>
Please enter your PIN ID:
<from action="login">
•••
4. Browser requests http://evil.com
Dear bank.com costumer,
Because of unusual number of invalid login 
attempts...
<a href="http://bank.com/redir?url=http://evil.com">
Sign in to verify</a>
1. User receives phishing e-mail
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Open Redirect Mitigation
http://bank.com/redir?url=http://evil.com2. Opens 
3. bank.com server code correctly handles request
boolean isValidRedirect(String url) {
List<String> validUrls = new ArrayList<String>();
validUrls.add("index");
validUrls.add("login");
return (url != null && validUrls.contains(url));
}
•••
if (!isValidRedirect(url)){
response.sendError(response.SC_NOT_FOUND, "Invalid URL");
•••
404 Invalid 
URL
Dear bank.com costumer,
•••
1. User receives phishing e-mail
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